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Panic-driven Austerity In The Eurozone And Its Implications

Authors: PAUL DE GRAUWE AND YUEMEI JI, Social Europe Journal 25/02/2013

Monday 25 February 2013, by Carlos San Juan

Eurozone policy seems driven by market sentiment. This column argues that fear and panic led to excessive, and possibly self-defeating, austerity in the south while failing to induce offsetting stimulus in the north. The resulting deflation bias produced the double-dip recession and perhaps more dire consequences. As it becomes obvious that austerity produces unnecessary suffering, millions may seek liberation from ‘euro shackles’.

Southern Eurozone countries have been forced to introduce severe austerity programs since 2011. Where did the forces that led these countries into austerity come from? Are these forces the result of deteriorating economic fundamentals that made austerity inevitable? Or could it be that the austerity dynamics were forced by fear and panic that erupted in the financial markets and then gripped policymakers. Furthermore, what are the implications of these severe austerity programs for the countries involved?

Presentation dowable bellow

What Have We Learnt about Monetary Integration

  1. The Frankfurt consensus
  2. The real business cycle theory
  3. The alternative OCA
  4. The logic of these Keynesian ideas
  5. The monetarist-real-business-cycle (MRBC) theory policy implications
  6. Conclusions [PAUL DE GRAUWE AND YUEMEI JI. Panic-driven Austerity In The Eurozone And Its Implications]

The facts: Austerity and spreads

There is a strong perception that countries that introduced austerity programs in the Eurozone were somehow forced to do so by the financial markets. Is this perception based on a reality? Data shows the average interest rate spreads in 2011 as measured by the Financial Times and the spreads by country. It is striking to find a very strong positive correlation.

The higher the spreads in 2011, the more intense were the austerity measures.

The intensity of the spreads can be explained almost uniquely by the size of the spreads (the R-squared is 0.97). Note the two extremes. Greece was confronted with extremely high spreads in 2011 and applied the most severe austerity measures, amounting to more than 10% of GDP per capita. Germany did not face any pressure from spreads and did not do any austerity.

Two theories about spreads

The next question that arises is whether the judgment of the market (measured by the spreads) about how much austerity each country should apply was the correct one. There are essentially two theories that can be invoked to answer this question. According to the first theory, the surging spreads observed from 2010 to the middle of 2012 were the result of deteriorating fundamentals (e.g., domestic government debt, external debt, competitiveness, etc.). Thus, the market was just a messenger of bad news. Its judgment should then be respected. The implication of that theory is that the only way these spreads can go down is by improving the fundamentals, mainly by austerity programs aimed at reducing government budget deficits and debts.

Another theory, while accepting that fundamentals matter, recognises that collective movements of fear and panic can have dramatic effects on spreads. These movements can drive the spreads away from underlying fundamentals, very much like in the stock markets, prices can be gripped by a bubble pushing them far away from underlying fundamentals. The implication of that theory is that while fundamentals cannot be ignored, there is a special role for the central bank that has to provide liquidity in times of market panic (De Grauwe 2011).

The decision by the ECB in 2012 to commit itself to unlimited support of the government bond markets was a game changer in the Eurozone.

It had dramatic effects by taking away the intense existential fears that the collapse of the Eurozone was imminent the ECB’s lender of last resort commitment pacified government bond markets and led to a strong decline in the spreads of the Eurozone countries.

This decision of the ECB provides us with an interesting experiment to test these two theories about how spreads are formed.

Some important conclusions of this paper:

We can now give the following interpretation of how the spreads exerted their influence on policymakers and led them to apply severe austerity measures. As the spreads increased due to market panic, these increases also gripped policymakers. Panic in the financial markets led to panic in the world of policymakers in Europe. As a result of this panic, rapid and intense austerity measures were imposed on countries experiencing these increases in spreads. The imposition of dramatic austerity measures was also forced by the fact that countries with high spreads were pushed into a liquidity crisis by the same market forces that produced the high spreads (De Grauwe 2011). This forced these countries to beg ‘cap in hand’ for funding from the creditor countries. (...)

The effects of panic-driven austerity

Some will say that this is the price that has to be paid for restoring budgetary orthodoxy. But is this so?

It is striking to find a strong positive correlation between the austerity measures and the subsequent change in the debt-to-GDP ratios. The more intense the austerity, the larger the subsequent increase in the debt-to-GDP ratios.

This is not really surprising, as we have learned from the previous figure, that those countries that applied the strongest austerity also saw their GDP (the denominator in the debt ratio) decline most forcefully. Thus, it can be concluded that

the sharp austerity measures that were imposed by market and policymakers’ panic not only produced deep recessions in the countries that were exposed to the medicine but also that up to now this medicine has not worked.

In fact, it led to even higher debt-to-GDP ratios and undermined the capacity of these countries to continue to service the debt.

Thus the liquidity crisis that started all this, risks degenerating into a solvency crisis. (...)


Three conclusions can be drawn from the previous analysis.

1) Since the start of the debt crisis financial markets have provided wrong signals; led by fear and panic, they pushed the spreads to artificially high levels and forced cash-strapped nations into intense austerity that produced great suffering.

They also gave these wrong signals to the European authorities, in particular the European Commission that went on a crusade trying to enforce more austerity.

Thus financial markets acquired great power in that they spread panic into the world of the European authorities that translated the market panic into enforcing excessive austerity. While the ECB finally acted in September 2012, it can also be argued that had it acted earlier much of the panic in the markets may not have occurred and the excessive austerity programs may have been avoided.

2) Panic and fear are not good guides for economic policies.

These sentiments have forced southern €Z countries into quick and intense austerity that not only led to deep recessions but also up to now, did not help to restore the sustainability of public finances.

On the contrary, the same austerity measures led to dramatic increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios in southern countries, thereby weakening their capacity to service their debts.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, we are not saying that southern European countries will not have to go through austerity so as to return to sustainable government finances. They will have to do so. What we are claiming is that the timing and the intensity of the austerity programs have been dictated too much by market sentiments of fear and panic instead of being the outcome of rational decision-making processes.

3) Financial markets did not signal northern countries to stimulate their economies, thus introducing a deflationary bias that lead to the double-dip recession.

The desirable budgetary stance for the Eurozone as a whole consists in the South pursuing austerity, albeit spread over a longer period of time, while the North engages in some fiscal stimulus so as to counter the deflationary forces originating from the South.

The northern countries have the capacity to do so. Most of them have now stabilised their debt-to-GDP ratios. As a result, they can allow a budget deficit and still keep their ratio constant. Germany in particular could have a budget deficit of close to 3%, which would keep its debt-to-GDP ratio constant. Given the size of Germany, this would allow for a significant stimulus for the Eurozone as a whole.

The intense austerity programs that have been dictated by financial markets create new risks for the Eurozone.

While the ECB’s 2012 decision to be a lender of last resort in the government bond markets eliminated the existential fears about the future of the Eurozone, the new risks for the future of the Eurozone now have shifted into the social and political sphere.

As it becomes obvious that the austerity programs produce unnecessary sufferings, especially for the millions of people who have been thrown into unemployment and poverty, resistance against these programs is likely to increase. A resistance that may lead millions of people to wish to be liberated from what they perceive to be shackles imposed by the euro.

Attached documents

    1. Monetary policy in the EMU
    2. What started as a banking crisis became a sovereign debt crisis
    3. Governance in the EMU
    4. Mundell I and Mundell II
    5. Optimal currency areas (OCA)
    6. Symmetry and flexibility in OCAs
    7. Symmetry and integration in OCAs
    8. Mundell II (1973)
    9. Mundell II became a major promoter of monetary union
    10. Maastricht Treaty & academic economists’ minds-Mundell IIMaastricht Treaty & academic economists’ minds Mundell II
    11. Mandell II and Monetarism
    12. Real Effective Exchange rate
    13. Inflation Gap
    14. Deficit expansion in Spain after the great recession of Sept.-08
    15. Endogeneity of the OCA Criteria
    16. Symetry & Flexibility: EMU
    17. UCL: Unit Labor Cost Breakdown, Spain
    18. The effect of monetary union on symmetry
    19. The Governance of Monetary Union
    20. Panic driven austerity
    21. Impact of austerity in GDP growth
    22. Impact of fiscal consolidation
    23. Austerity measure and spread 2011
    24. What should we think of these two strongly opposing views?
    25. Brussels–Frankfurt consensus
    26. The real business cycle theory
    27. The alternative OCA
    28. The logic of these Keynesian ideas
    29. The monetarist-real-business-cycle (MRBC) theory policy implications
    30. Conclusions

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